Free Will Rationally Speaking

From Rationally Speaking

RS39 - The Science and Philosophy of Free Will  

In this episode we tackle the never ending debate about free will, which David Hume famously defined as “a power of acting or of not acting, according to the determination of the will.” We do this with a couple of twists. We begin by examining the concept of free will from the standard philosophical perspective, then ask what — if anything — modern neuroscience can tell us about it, and come back to the interface between philosophy and science to explore how the two approaches may complement each other.

Comment on the episode teaser.

Julia's pick:  "Fluid Concepts And Creative Analogies: Computer Models Of The Fundamental Mechanisms Of Thought"

Massimo's pick: "Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale : The Moral Limits of Markets"

The episode discusses, among other things, the Benjamin Libit experiments, which seemed to suggest

You move to do something before you are aware of the thing you are doing.

As an example, Massimo Pigliucci described the act of getting a beer: You become aware you are thirsty, you get up to get the beer, and then you think, "Hey, There's a beer in the kitchen, I'm gonna go get it," somewhere between less than one second and seven secords after.

So this was discussed as an example of the basic incoherence of any argument for or against free will, because the decision was made at a subconscious level.

But I think it's not. I think it's simply an illustration of the fact that language is a layer. The seven seconds isn't an example of the desire existing before the mind becomes aware of it, but the time it takes to articulate the your mind's solution to the problem of the body's want.

And I think there is a also a rule that events within us happen in an evolutionarily chronological way, so it would make sense that language would kick in much later than desire, problem-solving, and action.